Opinion | The Fate of Israel’s Arab Parties

Political maneuvering has already begun for the 2026 Israeli elections, and one question is already on people’s minds: With everything that has happened, what role will the Arab parties play? Can they be in a coalition after the recent war and political turmoil?

The last time a government included an Arab party in the coalition—the Ra’am Party, four years ago—it was a historic first, aimed primarily at unseating Benjamin Netanyahu. But that government, led by Naftali Bennett, didn’t survive much more than a year, highlighting the inherent instability of such partnerships.

So, what kind of coalition will follow the next election? Israel has a parliamentary system, so after an election, one party emerges with the best chance to form a 61-member coalition (usually, though not always, because it has won the most seats) and must choose its partners. This brings to the fore ideological and practical dilemmas: Would a winning party choose to include in a coalition a party that opposes a military draft for Haredi men—despite a clear majority of voters wanting such a draft? Would a winning party choose to include in a coalition a party that supports a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—a goal that, these days, a clear majority of Israel’s voters oppose?

In a recent poll I conducted for the Jewish People Policy Institute, close to 60 percent of Israelis said no to a two-state solution. Or, to be more precise, they said they would rather see an unstable coalition than a more stable one that includes a party supportive of the two-state solution. They also said coalition builders should reject parties that do not believe Israel ought to be “a Jewish state.” Both of those rejected positions are held by some, perhaps most, Arab politicians. Specifically, when we asked which parties should not be part of the next coalition, regardless of the consequences, between 55 and 70 percent of respondents rejected two or all three of the existing Arab parties.

This might make you uncomfortable. It certainly makes me uncomfortable. It seems—what? Bigoted? Exclusionary? Discriminatory? Racist?

Before we jump to conclusions, let’s consider the situation more carefully.

We begin with a general premise: Some views, parties or groups are so far outside the mainstream that most citizens would not want them included in a ruling coalition, not even in a parliamentary system built on necessary compromise. Imagine an explicitly fascist party, or one that’s supportive of a nation’s military enemy. Most citizens in a democratic country would consider such a party ineligible to join a government coalition and would punish a political party that tried to include it. (Of course, things shift, and some would argue that there are parties currently in the Israeli government that would previously have been seen as out of bounds.)

How does this apply to Israeli Arab parties? One-fifth of Israelis are Arab, the vast majority of them Muslim. Most vote for “Arab parties”—parties that send mostly Arab representatives to the Knesset (there are currently 12 Arab members), where they represent views acceptable to Arab Israelis but largely rejected by most Jewish Israelis. For example, as noted, many Arab representatives support a two-state solution.

This used to be a position many Jewish Israelis also supported, but not anymore. For some Jews, it might be an idea for a faraway future under specific conditions, but not as a necessary remedy now, which is closer to how most Arab Israelis view it.

Questions concerning Arab-Jewish relations are often the most dramatic issues a government faces. On these matters, the position of Arab parties—even those that focus mostly on other matters, such as economic equality and integration—is hard for the Jewish majority to swallow. Could representatives of such opposing views cooperate in one governing coalition toward achieving other shared goals?

The recent war in Gaza brings all these issues to the fore. Could an Israeli coalition run another such war while in coalition with Arab parties and depending on their support? Probably not. The majority would be constantly frustrated by attempts of Arab members to tame the war, while Arab members would be under constant pressure from their constituents to pull out. Hopes that the war is over and less urgent issues will dominate are not a guarantee; the nature of war is that you can’t always plan for it.

The bottom line is troubling: A fifth of the population almost never gets to use its political leverage. It’s also nearly unavoidable, because Arab parties aren’t being excluded from government primarily based on racism—though that exists—but on real, deep differences regarding the most crucial dilemmas the country faces.

Can this change? Maybe. One or more of three improbable things would have to happen. Arab parties could change their tune to focus less on opposing security policies and more on internal civil concerns. Jewish parties could become more willing to ignore contrarian Arab positions as long as they aren’t disruptive. Or, simply, practical politics could intervene: It could turn out that the only way to form a functioning coalition is to include an Arab party. Can Israel muster the political will to jump any of these three high bars?

Shmuel Rosner is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute and editor of the Israel data-journalism project themadad.com.

Opening image credit: Zaher333 via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)