Early in 1934, as Adolf Hitler consolidated his stranglehold on Germany, a 25-year-old youth-group leader named Hans-Joachim Schoeps hailed the emerging dictatorship as the embodiment of “military order and discipline, will to power, and authority.” Schoeps embraced the adulation of Hitler, seeing the Nazis as Germany’s best hope to restore the nation to greatness.
But there was one problem. Schoeps was Jewish.
A self-styled monarchist and descendant of composer Felix Mendelssohn, Schoeps described Nazi antisemitism as a “not very important side effect.” Of course, the vast majority of Germany’s 525,000 Jews recognized that Nazism posed a threat. But a small number of politically conservative Jews saw themselves as indistinguishable from gentile Germans. They shared Hitler’s distaste for the Treaty of Versailles and the Weimar Republic.
Some Jewish conservatives belonged to splinter groups that wanted to “Make Germany Great Again.”
Conservative German Jews “had every intention (of) marching with the (Hitler) regime,” writes Philipp Nielsen, a historian and author of the book Between Heimat and Hatred: Jews and the Right in Germany, 1871-1935. Schoeps, who named his youth group the German Vanguard, didn’t appear to realize that “the National Socialists’ emphasis on race might also be a problem for him as a Jew.”
Conservative Jews (who longed for restoration of pre-World-War-One imperial Germany) were about 10 percent of the Jewish population, hardly numerous enough to be described as Hitler’s enablers. And to be sure, few if any voted for the Nazis in the crucial elections between 1930 and 1933, when Hitler brought the curtain down on parliamentary democracy in Germany. (Many drifted toward the non-Nazi German National People’s Party (known by the acronym DNVP, which also was antisemitic and little interested in Jewish support.) But their failure to accurately read the threat Hitler posed to Jews is a case study in what happens when a population has a clear idea of a leader’s track record of hatred but supports him anyway.
Once Hitler came to power in 1933, conservative German Jews implored him to recognize them as loyal Germans. Their presence in the western part of Germany, they argued, dated back at least to Charlemagne and the Carolingian Dynasty, circa 800 CE. Many had fought in the trenches of World War I—some 12,000 Jewish soldiers had died fighting for Germany.
Of course, there was absolutely no chance of changing Hitler’s mind. Hatred of Jews was a foundational principle of Nazism, as outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf. Yet some of these Jewish conservatives didn’t seem to care or they didn’t understand—or perhaps both.
They belonged to splinter groups that wanted to “Make Germany Great Again,” says Michael Brenner, a history professor of German and Jewish history at American University. Like their non-Jewish counterparts, conservative German Jews “saw Hitler as a potential vehicle for German national revival,” says Volker Benkert, who teaches German and European history at Arizona State University. “Conservative German Jews thus thought that if they would assimilate enough, they could be part of this political group, and the fact that many German Jews served in WWI would make them immune to Nazi antisemitic attacks.”
Max Naumann was another prominent conservative Jewish figure who (along with Schoeps) cozied up to the Nazis. A veteran of trench warfare in World War I who was awarded the Iron Cross, Naumann saw German Jews as an indivisible part of the German body politic. As head of the League of National German Jews (Verband nationaldeutscher Juden), he advocated total assimilation and opposed Zionism as a threat to Jews’ German identity. The group’s monthly publication, The National German Jew (Der nationaldeutsche Jude), reportedly had a circulation of 6,000 in 1927. According to historian Nielsen, Naumann once proposed moving the Jewish observance of Shabbat on Sunday to conform with the rest of Germany. Politically conservative Jews generally were anti-Zionist, believing advocacy for a Jewish state would undercut their status as Germans first.
After Hitler’s crucial appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933, Naumann stated: “We have always held the well-being of the German people and the Fatherland, to which we feel inextricably linked, above our own well-being. Thus, we greeted the results of January 1933, even though it has brought hardship to us personally.”
As Germany’s crucial election of March 1933 approached, Naumann attempted to flip the Nazi script by arguing “the election campaign must not be a struggle of religious conceptions, it must be a decisive struggle about our Germanness!”
The words fell on deaf ears. Hitler began stripping Jews of positions within the civil service, universities and the medical and legal professions. Jews were barred from acting in stage and film productions. The pre-Holocaust purge of Jews led to the 1935 Nuremberg laws that deprived Jews of German citizenship and forbade interfaith marriage and relationships.
Naumann and other conservative Jews looked to Italy’s Il Duce, Benito Mussolini, as a possible model—a fascist dictator who was not notably antisemitic. But for Hitler, a switch was never in the cards since antisemitism was hard-wired into Nazi ideology.
Conservative Jews also worked to undercut a stereotype they imagined was playing into Germany’s worst instincts about Jews. A consortium in 1929 bought a farm near Cottbus, southeast of Berlin, to demonstrate to Germany’s rural population that Jews too could endure hard agricultural labor. At the time, Berthold Timendorfer of the B’nai B’rith Masonic Lodge called the farm an important element in the “war against antisemitic stereotypes.”
Some conservative Jews believed Hitler stoked antisemitism only as a way to “stir up the masses,” wrote Carol Ann Gordon in her 1984 book Hitler, Germans and the ‘Jewish Question.’ Others didn’t believe Hitler would last that long, considering the volatility of German politics.
Similarly, Schoeps, Naumann and others sought to deflect Nazi antisemitism by drawing distinctions between themselves and “Eastern European Jews”—more recent arrivals on German soil from Poland and former Austro-Hungarian regions such as Galicia (much of which is in present-day Ukraine). These Jews embodied the stereotypes of shtetl Jews and primarily spoke Yiddish. Some were Social Democrats or Communists. They were a sharp contrast to the long-standing Jewish communities in the Rhineland who spoke German and were not particularly distinguishable from non-Jewish Germans.
They “hoped to convince Hitler that Jews would be loyal followers if he only erased antisemitism from his program,” says Brenner of American University. “In order to do so they were ready to disassociate themselves from the Eastern European Jewish immigrants.”
One conservative Jew in Germany, Leo Löwenstein, appealed directly to Hitler on behalf of Jewish veterans of World War I. He won a meeting with a Hitler underling who asked him to write a follow-up memo. In it, Löwenstein drew a distinction between Eastern European non-citizen Jews (whom he suggested were overly active in left-wing anti-Nazi politics) and “indigenous” Jews who were loyal. Löwenstein promised that through his Jewish veterans group, young Jews would be educated in military spirit and groomed for military service.
Löwenstein made little progress with Hitler’s staff but found a more receptive audience in an appeal to Germany’s president, Paul von Hindenburg, who exempted Jewish war veterans from antisemitic dictates. But von Hindenburg died in 1934 and the status of Jewish war veterans faded away as the 1935 Nuremberg decrees took effect and the Nazis plunged forward to Kristallnacht, war and the “final solution.”
Jews on the right eventually realized that loyalty to Germany afforded them no protection against the Nazis. In the eyes of Hitler, they were simply Jews and not special. The Holocaust loomed before them, as it did for all German Jews and, indeed, the entire Jewish population of Europe.
Löwenstein was sent to Theresienstadt but survived the war. He died in 1956 on a visit to Israel. The Gestapo closed down Naumann’s League of National German Jews in 1935, and he died of cancer in 1939. Schoeps fled to Sweden after Kristallnacht in 1938, where he sat out the war. His parents were less fortunate. His father died in Theresienstadt; his mother, at Auschwitz. He returned to Germany after the war and became a professor of religious history; he died in 1980. Some years after his return, Schoeps was derided as a “Heil-Hitler Jew” (“Heil-Hitler Jude”).
His son, Julius Schoeps, angrily denied Schoeps had been a Nazi. His father, like other German Jews, believed Hitler and the Nazis were “a nightmare that would soon pass,” he said in a 2019 interview. He acknowledged his father thought it “possible for German Jews to come to some kind of arrangement with the regime.” But, he added, “that was a mistake.”
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Doesn’t surprise me. To this day German Jews look down on Polish Jews and think they are superior. Scary!
Sounds like the group my great uncle was in. The Central Association of Jews. They were more German than Jewish. But the Nazis ended up murdering him regardless of how German he was
this is the best reminder for Jews who think they’re exempt from racism, extremism; for those who tolerate or foment internal conflict and hatred of difference, rather than fighting to gain strength in diversity, mutual respect, and unity.
Hitler’s lesson – we’re all Jews no matter educational degrees, geography, background, money, connections, occupation, and societal contributions.
We all ened up the same.
It’s wrong to characterize Naumann as a conservative. He was an assimilationist, someone willing to disavow his Judaism. His affiliation was with the Deutsche Volkspartei, which was a mixed liberal-conservative party during Weimar. The GPP was more representative of mainstream liberalism in Germany than conservatism, which was added later to reflect an anti-communist spin. Nauman was a member of its predecessor party, the National Liberal Party. Brener, I think, mischaracterizes what Nauman wanted to do. It was not that they just thought to disassociate themselves from Eastern European Jews; it was that they didn’t believe Eastern European Jews could separate from their Judaism and German Jews could shed their religious behavior.
This sounds hauntingly parallel to some reactions to the current situation in the US with the new administration scapegoating immigrant.