The following Interview was recorded on October 17, 2024, and has been edited for length and clarity. Watch the video here.
Ghaith al-Omari is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine. He served as adviser to the negotiating team during the 1999 to 2001 permanent status talks, in addition to holding various other positions within the Palestinian Authority.
Today we had some major news, a confirmation of the death of the mastermind of October 7. How does the death of this one man, Yahya Sinwar, change things? Will it help to end the cycle of violence that we’re in right now? Does it bring us any closer to a cease-fire?
It’s often said that individuals don’t matter, that these movements continue. And that may be right at some level, but sometimes individuals make a huge difference. Yahya Sinwar was one of these unique individuals. He had what no other Hamas leader had, which is credibility with both the political and the military wings of Hamas. Since October 7, he had not only been making all the big political decisions relating to cease-fire negotiations and the hostages but also the operational decisions on the ground.
“Is the death of Sinwar going to break the barrier of fear that many Gazans feel? Or will Hamas crack down further on any dissent in Gaza to present an image of unity?”
His death creates a major vacuum in Hamas, particularly after the killing of other major Hamas leaders, and an opportunity for a cease-fire. It is well known that Sinwar was the biggest obstacle toward reaching a hostage deal. He was someone who felt that time was on his side and who was not easy to pressure. Things have changed right now. The next Hamas leader will have to come from the diaspora Hamas group based in Qatar. These are people who are susceptible to pressure from the Qataris, from the Egyptians, both of whom are susceptible to pressure from the United States. So, there is this kind of opening. Right now, the real question is: Will Israel take the initiative to renew the negotiations and propose terms that can be accepted? Israel created an opening—now it’s up to Israel to either use it or lose it.
So, if this is an opportunity for Netanyahu to pursue peace, who does he pursue it with?
Netanyahu has two sets of considerations. He can come out and say, I got the guy who was behind [October 7]; justice has been served. Hamas has been destroyed as a military organization, and they’re now simply an insurgency that can be dealt with by other means. But he has his own political considerations that relate to the survival of his coalition, many members of which do not want to actually end the war.
In terms of who he would talk to, I don’t think that’s going to be a big problem. In a week or two, we will know who the next Hamas leader is, if not formally. Because it could well be that they decide not to formally choose a leader. (This is what Hezbollah is doing right now in Lebanon.) But we will know who the de facto leader is, and conversations will happen through the Egyptians and the Qataris, who have very detailed insight into the internal dynamics of Hamas.
There are other problems, potentially. For example, the new leader might not have the credibility to control the military wing. We might start seeing splintering there. These are all possibilities, but, again, the momentum has shifted.
Obviously we’re talking about Hamas and Gaza, but there’s also strong support for Hamas in parts of the West Bank How does Sinwar’s death impact the Palestinian Authority?
Hamas has been trying for a long time now to fire things up in the West Bank, and they have so far failed, partly because of Israeli security measures. And I have to say that these Israeli security methods have exacted a huge toll on Palestinian civilians. I mean, the death count is comparable to the worst days of the Second Intifada. Yet, a lot of militant leaders were killed there. The Palestinian Authority itself has been cracking down on Hamas, and there is no doubt that this will anger Palestinians in the West Bank.
In the longer term, if current trends continue, whereby the PA is basically bankrupt and can’t pay salaries and is seen as corrupt, and if settler attacks against Palestinians continue, then it’s only a matter of time until things get out of control there. But in the short term—you know, famous last words—things seem to be under control.
You mentioned that there’s a difference between the political wing of Hamas and the military wing of Hamas. How does that play out in the West Bank? In the Palestinian Authority?
To be clear, when I say there’s a difference, I by no means mean that the political wing is made up of moderates. Hamas, as an organization, is committed to the destruction of Israel using terror. That’s part of their DNA. I do think, though, that they have different views on how to do things. The military wing, unsurprisingly, believes that only the use of force can achieve their objective. The political wing, particularly people like Khalid Mishal, the old-time leader of Hamas who’s going to make a bid now for the leadership after Sinwar’s death, believe they got what they needed from the military, from October 7.
It doesn’t really matter in the West Bank, because at the end of the day, the military wing of Hamas is now quite weak. And while Hamas is more popular in the West Bank than it is in Gaza, they have no meaningful presence politically. Right now that presence is mainly in Qatar.
Have you talked to people in Gaza about what they’re feeling and thinking?
It’s very hard to communicate with people. There is concern about reprisals from the remaining parts of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza. The main concern I have right now is that they might harm some of the hostages. Some junior guy (they’re all guys, by the way) who is guarding hostages might decide to go and kill one of them, or it could be a political decision to kill a few hostages in order to send a message to Israel that there was a cost to killing Sinwar. That’s why coming up with an initiative quickly, as soon as possible, would be very important to shape the dynamics.
So, for example, offering a cease-fire deal that includes hostages being released immediately?
Netanyahu hinted at something like this in a statement earlier, but at the same time, he said the war is going to continue. So, there’s still a lack of clarity. This is the moment to come up with something bold and clear that definitely has to include the release of hostages and the disarmament of Hamas. These are the basics, but it should be made clear that if these conditions are met, then the war is over. This would also enable some of the Arab countries to put more pressure on Hamas.
It’s been a little over one year since October 7, a year that changed the world and a year that seemed to push the possibility of a two-state solution further into the future. Does the death of Sinwar perhaps move that timetable up?
It might have nudged it a little notch, but it has not changed the major calculation, which unfortunately, is that the Palestinians and Israelis do not trust one another. Because of the traumas that both have suffered since October 7, it’s hard to imagine how the trust will be rebuilt. It’s also true that the Israeli political system is divided, and so is the Palestinian political system. It’s very hard to see a leader on either side who can make the necessary big decisions.
Where I have—I don’t like to use the word hope because it almost feels obscene in this limitless tragedy—but I think the opening we’re starting to see among Arab countries and in the world is a sense that we need to renew our efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while also understanding that it is complicated. So, I suspect once the war is over, we’ll start seeing more of a diplomatic push, which, frankly, before October 7 just wasn’t there. We’ll start seeing Saudi-Israeli normalization being linked to a Palestinian state, or at least a pathway toward it. And I hope that we will also start seeing serious efforts to reform the Palestinian Authority and turn it into an organization that is, first and foremost, worthy of the respect of its own public and therefore capable of reaching a deal. But this is time-consuming. In the meantime, we have a lot on our hands just in terms of Gaza’s reconstruction.
So, in a terrible way, it seems like Sinwar’s hope of putting Palestinian statehood back on the international calendar has happened.
On the one hand, you are right. I mean, there’s no denying that October 7 was a reminder that the Palestinian issue can still destabilize the whole region and beyond. On the other hand, I think Sinwar and Hamas’s vision of a Palestinian state is radically different from a two-state solution. For them, a Palestinian state means the destruction of Israel to create a theocracy. If, not to be pollyannaish about it, we can create a vision that is different, of a two-state solution that achieves peace with Israel and is reinforced by Arab countries, by Muslim countries, as well as the rest of the world, it will be a major blow to Hamas’s vision. It will be a message to Hamas that you might have put it back on the map, but your vision of a Palestinian state is one that we do not buy.
Although people support Hamas, it is not like they want the kind of life or the community that Hamas brings. How do Palestinians reconcile that?
First of all, we’re all full of contradictions, and the Palestinians are no different. One of my colleagues at the Washington Institute recently conducted a poll looking at the area of Hebron, in the south of the West Bank, that showed the highest support for Hamas and the lowest support for violence. Why? Because that is an area that is, by Palestinian standards, actually quite prosperous; there are jobs, etc. I think a lot of Palestinians will theoretically support Hamas because it’s standing up for the cause. But when it comes down to making decisions that impact people’s lives, most people tend to be more rational. People don’t want to go through what Gaza has gone through and what Lebanon is going through right now.
You haven’t been able to talk to anyone, but have you been reading reports about how people in the Gaza Strip are actually responding right now and reacting?
Hamas has been very brutal in cracking down on any dissent. A woman, an activist, was killed by Hamas because of a Facebook post. People have had their limbs broken, and so on. But looking at polls, Hamas has already lost a lot of popularity among Palestinians in Gaza, the people who have had to pay the price for Hamas’s murderous policies. The real question right now, and this is one that I know is being asked, is: Is the death of Sinwar going to break the barrier of fear that many Gazans feel? Or will Hamas crack down further on any dissent in Gaza to present an image of unity? But again, this is one of those moments when we just don’t know how the public is going to act. I suspect that many in Gaza are not shedding too many tears [for Sinwar].
It’s going to be interesting to see if Hamas can maintain discipline and cohesion, because Sinwar was the guy who basically ran everything by himself. He had two deputies, both of whom are still alive. One of them is his brother, and there’s another guy in the northern West Bank. I doubt whether one of them can step up to fill that vacuum. We do know that Hamas’s ability to coordinate and to act in a sustained way has been delivered a major hit. It’s down, but it’s not out yet.
Was there something unique about Sinwar that his brother doesn’t have?
Sinwar was a product of decades of mythmaking. He came from the founding generation of Hamas (he joined in the third year of its existence). He was a leader among Hamas prisoners when he was in Israeli jails, and that is a major status symbol within Hamas. He was a leader of the military wing and then he became the leader of Gaza in 2017. All of these things came together to build this larger-than-life character, and his brother never had that. His brother has always been in the military wing, and there are a lot of rumors swirling about corruption and other kinds of misconduct that make him less appealing. The other competitors, particularly those in Qatar, see him as a small fry, and they have enough of a following and enough credibility to quash him. So, I’m very doubtful that he will emerge as a leader.
Will Iran respond on behalf of Hamas?
Sinwar was never close to the Ayatollah. Nor was he killed on Iranian soil. And while Iran has lost one of its main assets in the region, in the same way as when the Hezbollah leader was killed, this is almost a sideshow for Iran, because it is awaiting the Israeli retaliation for its attack on October 1, which we know is shaping up to be something big. The United States is sending a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Israel. The U.S. attack yesterday, using B-2 bombers and major munitions on the Iranian proxy in Yemen, was a message to Iran. All to say that right now, Iran has bigger concerns on its mind than what happened to Sinwar.
Might that retaliatory attack by Israel be nixed by what happened today? Or are these completely different channels of war?
Ultimately, they are connected, because if you get a cease-fire in Gaza, it makes it easier to get a cease-fire in Lebanon, and that could defang one of Iran’s proxies. But for the time being, all of these tracks are going to be based on their own separate logic.
What about the impact on the leadership of the Palestinian Authority? Does this make Mahmoud Abbas weaker? Are there some new leaders who are jockeying around him now?
You would think that the elimination of his biggest competitor would strengthen him, however, he is so discredited and weak. Yet, there are no leaders right now who are competing with him. There are many who would like to see him go so they can get their chance, but he still has full control of the strings of power in the West Bank.
Has Netanyahu consolidated his position in Israel in the last few weeks? Are you expecting any change in government there?
I doubt it. Between Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, they can still bring down the government.
It’s been an incredible year in the world. Is there any lesson that you’ve learned from this year, maybe something that surprised you or something that disappointed you, or something that gives you hope?
I will start with the bad and maybe end with the good. I guess the bad is that what I’ve always believed has been reinforced, which is that things can always get worse in the Middle East. The tragedy of the last year is proof that you cannot ignore this region. That there is now an understanding that you cannot ignore this conflict—this is something good. When I go to the Gulf countries, when I go to the Middle East, and also when I talk to people in Washington, there’s a sense that we cannot basically wish it away. I just hope that this sense is translated into meaningful policy.
Top image: Drone Shows Airstrike Aftermath in Deir al-Balah (Credit: Voice of America).